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Our social sciences are seeking a new
orientation. For roughly three hundred
years the scholars in these fields of know
ledge have been pursuing the truth in the
intellectual squirrel cage of scientific
thought. It was Thomas Hobbes, that
wisp of a British mathematician, that
started social scientists on the road to in
tellectual and moral frustration. By his
emphasis upon the primacy of the hedon
istic iridividual and the method of rational
science he turned the intellectual world
upside down. From that time forth men
were to abandon the canons of thought
which rested upon faith in a sovereign
God and to substitute in their place a faith
in a sovereign universe.
The effects of this naturalistic orienta
tion were not immediately evident. Few men
saw the results of transferring the found
ations of their thought from the premises
of Augustine to those of Descartes and
Hobbes. Writers such as Locke lived in
the pattern of the strictest Puritan but
thought in the language of the urbane
pagan. What would happen when the
"salt" of the Christian assumptions had
lost its "savor" and only the sanctions
of the rationalized concept of past ex
perience remained? Only the excesses of
the late eighteenth century revolutions
and the disasters of the early twentieth
century holocausts could tell.
It may appear to some that this is a
far-fetched observation. Few students of
the social sciences realize that the basic
assumptions of any science of society are
consonant with the total culture of which
they are a part.* A hasty review of the
history of social thought reveals the fact
that the social science of the classical
'R. S. Lynd, Kndwledge for What? The Place
of Social Science in American Culture (Princeton
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1939),
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world was cast in the mold of the re
flective sciences of that cultural period.
Herodotus cannot be adequately under
stood apart from the work of Thales and
Heraclitus, nor can Thucydides be properly
appreciated unless studied in the light of
Hippocrates and Galen. Aristotle, also.
drew inspiration from these sources. The
Christian publicists leaned heavily upon
Plato's Timaeus as well as the cosmology
of the Hebrew Scriptures for their social
epistemology.*
The mediaeval world witnessed a grow
ing fission between a culture viewed within
the Christian framework of ideas and that
prehended through the scientific frame
work brought to life in the renaissance of
classical culture. Aquinas endeavored to
weld these conflicting orientations into
a universal synthesis which offered to cre
ate a new framework for the social thought
of the West. Marsiglio of Padua gave
warning in the fourteenth century that
the union could not be permanent. Luther
and Calvin strove to lead the Western
world back to thoroughly Christian pre
suppositions. But by the seventeenth cen
tury Hobbes had frankly renounced all
revelational elements in his framework
of thought and had launched boldly upon
an attempt to place social science within
the framework of the natural sciences of
the Greeks. In so doing he chose to divorce
social thought in the West from the great
presuppositions which had been the foun
dation for all social thinkers for over
a millenium.
Nature now became the deity of the
Western world. All of the creative attributes
of the God of the Hebrew-Christian
system were transferred to that hypostasis
of the natural universe known as Nature.
*C. N. Cochrane, Christianity and Classical
Culture (Oxford University Press, New York,
1944), 458-459, 469-471.
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The universe was presumed to be mech
anistic in operation, mathematical in com
position, and geometric in design. God
could be understood perfectly by under
standing Nature. Man could be identified
only as a part of Nature. Society was the
creation of man in harmony with the laws
of Nature. Hence, if one would know
society and the social life of man he must
erect a "social physics," that is, a science
of society based upon a study of the
"natural laws" of society.
The fruit of this endeavor is to be
found in the work of Comte, Marx and
Spencer in the nineteenth century. Two of
these men, Comte and Marx, deserve
special mention. The first is to be noted
for his popularization of positivism as
the method of science. In this system
scientific study was held to deal only with
the attributes of things revealed to the
senses through observation and classific
ation. The generalizations thus developed
were held to be scientific laws upon which
a science of society could be erected.
When once constructed this body of
science would grant prevision to men and
thus enable human leaders to plan public
policy with a greater degree of accuracy.
and efficiency. Comte was seeking for a
basis of ideological unity in the Western
world. He thought that he had found it in
the directly observable phenomena of
social life. These data, inductively per
ceived and classified, would be recogniz
able by all because a part of their ex
perience. Positive truth would then be the
ideological framework of Western culture.
Comte's importance as a scientific phil
osopher has long since been diminished by
the more mature observations of other
scholars. The fact that Comte discouraged
the use of microscopes and instruments
of precise measurement in scientific in
vestigation, because they brought to light
data not immediately discernable to the
layman and thereby upset his plan to use
only that data within the observation of all,
has thrown suspicion upon his character
as a scientist. When it is also known that
Comte repudiated many of his ideas con
cerning the validity of human reason and
scientific truth as set forth in Cours de
PhUosophie Positive (Paric, 1830-1842),
and that he boldly returned to the metaphy
sical basis of thinking in his System of
Positive Polity (1851-1854)) it is to be
recognized that Comte had serious mis
givings about the validity of his whole
system." Yet his early advocacy of a
science of society, which he first called
social physics and later (1838) sociology,
remains as part of our culture as well as
his insistence upon the inductive methods
of observation then employed in the
physical sciences as the only legitimate
approach to the study of social phenomena.
In fact, it can safely be affirmed that
Comte's vision of a social science that
would bring predictive control within the
hand of man is still the motivating spirit
of social scientists today. Gunnar Myrdal,
the noted Swedish social scientist, has re
cently declared :
The rationalism and moralism which is the
driving force behind social study is the
faith that institutions can be improved and
strengthened and that people are good enough to
live a happier life ... To find the practical
formulas for this never-ending reconstruction of
society is the supreme task of social science.
.... We have today in social science a greater
trust in the improvability of man and society
that we have ever had since the Enlightenment.*
The work of Karl Marx is still more
interesting as an example of the interaction
between the science of the nineteenth cen
tury and social theory. Marx is usally
associated with Hegel because of his use
of the dialectical mode in his treatment of
materialistic influences in the universe.
Hegel, it will be remembered, employed a
form of dialectical idealism; Marx shift
ed the emphasis to a dialectical mater
ialism. What is not often recognized in
Marx' insistence upon the primacy of
materialistic forces is his debt to classical
and modern science. Marx was a very
careful student of ancient philosophy. His
'System of Positive Polity (London, 1875-
1877), I, 341.
*Gunnar Myrdal, The American Dilemma
(Harper and Brothers, New York, 1944), II,
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doctoral dissertation at the University of
Jena was entitled, "The Difference be
tween the Democritean and Epicurean
Natural Philosophy/" His familiarity with
the Greek philosophers enabled him to
discover the original sources of Hegel's
dialectic in the dialectical materialism of
Heraclitus, He, therefore, repudiated the
idealistic application of Hegel for the
materialistic thesis of the original and in
so doing made Hegel appear as if stand
ing on his head.*
The presuppositions of Heraclitus had
been highly refined by the nineteenth cen
tury scientists. Early in the century Sadi
Carnot, (1796-1832) the brilliant French
physicist, had developed the principle
known as the second law of thermody
namics. A few years later Rudolf Clausius
(1822-1888) amplified this general priii-
ciple into a scientific theory by an elabor
ate series of tests and observations. His
idea that the molecules in electrolytes are
continUillly interqhang^ng atoms became
popularized as the Clausian theory of en
tropy. By the terms of this system the
whole universe was conceived as in the
process of continuous change. The static
view of the world as sustained by natural
law was thrown into the discard as no
longer tenable. With it went the whole
body of social theory which had been based
upon those presuppositions. A search for
dynamic or changing concepts followed.
Darwin seized upon the concept of eternal
struggle as the motivating factor for
change in the natural universe. His Origin
of Species which appeared in 1859 served
as an inspiration to Marx and aided him
in formulating a social theory built more
directly upon the Gausian base.*
These influences are directly observable
in Marx' insistence upon the principle of
"Chester Maxey, Political Philosophies (Mac-
millan. New York, 1938), 567; Isaiah Berlin, Karl
Marx (Oxford University Press, New York,
1948, second edition), 78.
"C. N. Cochrane, Christianity and Classical
Culture, fn423.
'Vernon Venable, Human Natures The
Marxian View (Alfred A. Knopf, New York,
1945), 14-15.
continuous change in human society and
his refusal to deal with men as individuals.*
Men were to be studied collectively. To do
otherwise was to view them as something
other than men. It was the collective ex
perience of men that formed the basis for
empirical study. Men thought and acted in
association with each other within the
framework of a material universe anala-
gous to that within which the atom or
molecule existed. Men were subject to the
same material forces, impersonal in nature
and therefore subject to empirical obser
vation and classification. The "dialectic"
of human life in society was not looked
upon as cause in the ontological sense. It
was, says Vernon, "the formal structure of
material processes whose particular con
tent, direction and tempo can be determin
ed only by empirical examination."*
Engels expressed the Marxian view
very clearly when he wrote in his Ludwig
Feuerbach: "...the conflict of innumerable
individual wills and individual actions in
the domain of history produces a state of
affairs entirely analogous to that in the real
of unconscious nature. The ends of the
actions are intended, but the results which
actually follow from these actions are not
intended. . . Historical events thus appear
on the whole to be likewise governed by
chance. But where on the surface accident
holds sway, there actually it is always gov
erned by inner, hidden laws and it is only
a matter of discovering these laws.""
The importance of the Marxian in
fluence upon social theory cannot be mini
mized. Its professed adherence to the
canons of physical science has won for it
a place in Western culture out of all pro
portion to its validity as a scientific system
of thought." Indeed, it has passed from
the realm of science to the realm of faith.
Appearing now in the gospel of Com
munism it threatens to enthral the entire
*Vernon Venable, op. cit., 13-14
'lUd., 173.
"Cited in Robert P. Casey, Religion in Russia,
(Harper and Brothers, New York, 1946) 73-74.
"Pitirim Sorokin, Contempdrary Sociological
Theories, (Harper and Brothers, New York
1928) 527-546.
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Eastern and Western world." And all of
this in spite of the fact that both history
and science have raised questions as to the
validity of its predictions. History has de
monstrated that the class struggle does not
always result in the destruction of the en
trepreneur and the elevation of the
proletariat. Science has concluded since the
announcement of the principle of indeter-
minancy by Heisenberg in 1927 that pre
diction is indeterminate in character for the
atomic universe. Planck's more and recent
discovery that natural forces are not con
tinuous tends to throw doubt upon the
whole concept of a teleological dialectic. In
a word, scientific theory has deserted the
Marxian hypothesis, leaving his social
theory bereft of its entire system of con
structs.
The fate of Marxian social theory is the
fate of all social theory which is tied to the
epistemology of the physical sciences. The
whole concept of uniformity in the natural
world, which formed the basic pre
supposition for order and law in the social
world, is now swept away. The idea of law
derived through empirical observation is
now admitted to be at best a statistical
average." Scientific prediction has moved
from the realm of the absolute to that of
the relative or probable. In effect, all that
we may assert to be scientific truth in the
social realm is verified historical ex
perience. We can never claim imiversally
predictable validity for our hypotheses in
the realm of social science any more than
we can claim such for the field of the
physical sciences.
A number of social scientists are today
calling for a reorientation of this field of
inquiry. Gunnar Myrdal in his recent study
of the Negro in America challenges stu
dent of society to clarify their position as
scientific investigators and interpreters. He
lays particular stress upon the importance
" Cesar Barja, "The Outlook for European
Culture in The Outlook for Postwar Europe
(University of California Press, Berkeley, Cali
fornia, 1945), 84-85.
"A. S. Eddington, The Nature of the Physi
cal World, (Macmillan, New York, 1928) 98.
of recognizing certain a priori assumptions
in one's work (a position that has been
bitterly contested by all of the followers of
Comte and Dewey), and the necessity of
clarifying and defining the terms and con
cepts used in research. He makes bold to
assert that social scientists are dealing with
thinking human beings and that the pre
vailing climate of opinion is an important
scientific datum in analyzing hmnan be
havior." Robert M. Maclver of Columbia
University has coined the phrase "dynamic
assessment" to focus attention upon the
fact that men make decisions leading to
action within a framework of environ
mental influences which included not only
the social and technological order but the
cultural order which embiaces the realm of
ideas in traditions, faith and philosophies."
Others such as Robert S. Lynd of Middle-
town fame are in revolt against the en
slavement of the social sciences to the
empirical method of the physical sciences.
He believes that the method leads to the
arbitrary exclusion of pertinent data from
the field of observation."
A few of our modern social scientists
have made bold to adopt a new viewpoint
for the study of man. Pitrim Sorokin of
Harvard University has frankly rejected
the limited universal of the natural science
approach. He has endeavored to recognize
within the existing culture various orders
of truth including that of religious faith.
By so doing he has again admitted to the
scope of scientific consciousness the reality
of spiritual power which transcends that
of either the mind or the senses. He en
deavors to interpret culture in reference
to norms that are "given" and not
empirically derived from a set of circum
stances. For Sorokin the motion of men in
society is not that of mechanical regularity,
but one of fluctuation. There is no move
ment of linear or cyclical progress as long
advocated by adherents to the various
''An American Dilemma, II, Appendix 2, pp.
1032-1057.
^Social Causati&n, (Ginn and Company, New
York, 1942), 271-274.
'"Kn&wledge for What? 123-125.
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scientific traditions."
Arnold Toynbee, the English historian,
has employed a similar orientation in his
prodigious study of twenty-six civilizations.
For Toynbee the pattern of motion in
societies is one of challenge and response
both to the physical and social environ
ment and to the problems involved in
successfully conducting the civilization pro
duced." He denies the organic character of
civilizations, which is an attempt to identify
the life of men with that of biological
organisms, and substitutes therefor a set
of relations existing between living men in
a given society at a particular moment in
history. By accepting the world view of
Augustine and the early Christian publicists
"Hans Speier, "The Sociological Ideas of
Pitirim Alexandrovitch Sorokin. 'Integralist'
Sociology" in H. E. Barnes, ef al. An Intro
duction to the History of Sociology, 884-900.
"Arnold J. Toynbee, Civilisation on Trial
(Oxford University Press, New York, 1948),
3-15.
he projects his findings against a back
ground which views God as an active agent
in the universe.'*
This break with naturalistic presup
positions in the social sciences is one of the
most challenging developments in our day."
It opens the way for a reconsideration of
the problems of our time in the light of the
Christian revelation. Within the scope of
these newer approaches to the problems of
man the Christian doctrines of sin and
redemption have real meaning. They open
the door in a new way to the application of
the Gospel to the amelioration of himian
problems in our time.
"'H. E. Barnes, op cit., 717-736; Time, March
17, 1947, 71-79.
'"See Kenneth Scott Latourette, "The Christ
ian Understanding of History," American His
torical Review, LIV : 259-276, for a recent pre
sentation of the Christian view of history as the
working framework ot one of America's most
distinguished historians.
